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dividends from securities does not of itself constitute the conduct of a business.
The broad rule of discretionary authority in the court to sustain or disregard a
corporation created without business purpose is thoroughly adequate to sustain
the decision of the court that the foreign corporation should be disregarded in
determining the income tax effect of these transactions.
The holding of this case probably will not develop or protect any substantial
amount of income tax revenue for the federal government in the future, howver,
since the petitioner in this case pursued an. involved course, the like of which would
be required to develop income tax liability in the case of a non-resident alien. Upon
his expatriation by taking the oath of allegiance to the King of England, in
Canada, 26 and through his taking up residence outside the United States, the petitioner became subject to income tax only upon his income from sources within
the United States. 27 Had he sold the stock of the domestic corporation in Canada,
or elsewhere outside the United States, it is clear that no tax liability to the United
States would have arisen, 28 and profiting by the object lesson of this decision,
others, similarly, situated to the taxpayer in the principal case, may be able to avoid
such a tax result.

OBITER DICTA
"An obiter dictum, in the language of the law, is a gratuitous opinion, an
individual impertinence, which, whether it be wise or foolish, right or wrong,
bindeth none-not even the lips that utter it."*
WARDs

OF ADMIRALTY AND

LEGISLATURE

Seamen have traditionally been the wards of the Admiralty courts. The judges
in Admiralty have always protected those who go down to the sea in ships from those
who would seek to take advantage of them. Protective rules
Sailor
of law grew up in regard to seamen, their rights and obligaBewarel
tions, which exceeded the protection given to other callings
in the common law courts. Admiralty always sought to protect seamen from their own imprudent acts. But in later years these doctrines began
to lag behind the modem Workmen's Compensation laws in the amount of security
and compensation afforded to seamen for personal injuries. Congress remedied this
situation in 1920 by the passage of'the Jones Act 41 STAT. 1007, 46 U. S. C. A. § 688
(1920) which extended the benefits of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to seamen, 35 STAT. 65, 45 U. S. C. A. § 51 et seq. (1908).
26. REV. STAT. § 1999, 8 U. S. C. A. § 800 (1920); 54 STAT. 1168, 8 U. S. C. A. § 301
(1940).
27. Section 212 (a) Internal Revenue Code, 53 STAT. 76, 26 U. S. C. A. § 212 (a) (1939).
28. A non-resident alien does not realize sources within the United States by the sale

of personal property outside the United States. Section 119 (e) Internal Revenue Code,
53

STAT.

53, 26 U. S. C. A. § 119 (e) (1938).

*Birrel, Obiter Dicta (1885) title page.
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The Supreme Court recently expanded the doctrine of the maritime law as to the
right of seamen to recover for personal injuries resulting from the use of unseaThe
worthy appliances. The effect of the decision is to make. the
owner Qf any vessel an insurer of the good condition of each
Mahnich
and every piece of equipment used by a seaman in the operCase
ation of the ship. Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.,
U. S. -, 64 Sup. Ct. 455 (1944). There a seaman, who was barred by the Statute
of Limitations from suing under the Jones Act, sued under the general maritime law
for indemnity by reason of injuries sustained by a defective appliance, and for maintenance and cure. The injuries were sustained while the seaman was engaged in
painting part of the ship because the rope supporting the stage on which he was
standing broke, and he was thrown to the deck. The first officer had chosen the rope
in order to rig the stage. The seaman claimed the ship was unseawbrthy as the rope
supplied was defective. In the District Court, and in the Circuit Court of Appeals,
the libel was dismissed as to the claim based on unseaworthiness, but maintenance and cure were allowed. The dismissal was based on the decision in Plamals
v. The Pinar del Rio, 277 U. S. 151, 48 Sup. Ct. 457 (1928). But the Supreme Court
refused to follow the former decision.
In Plamals v. The Pinardel Rio the same basic facts existed. The Court found that
there was a sufficient supply of good rope available to make the ship seaworthy as
to the seamen. The fact that there was a bad rope on board
The
did not make the ship unseaworthy. The seaman was injured
Pinar
because the mate negligently picked the bad rope. This
del Rio
was negligence of a fellow servant, and there could be no
recovery against the owner of the ship. The District Court and the Circuit Court of
Appeals felt constrained to follow this decision which closely paralleled the situation
in the principal "case.
The majority of the Supreme Court held that under the rule established in The
Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 23 Sup. Ct. 483 (1903), the vessel and the owner are liable
to indemnify a seaman for injuries caused by unseaworthiness of the vessel or its
appurtenant appliances and equipment. The exercise of due diligence does not relieve the owner of his obligation to furnish adequate appliances. Carlisle Packing Co.
v. Sandanger, 259 U. S. 255, 42 Sup. Ct. 475 (1922). Hence the Court reasons
that a fortiori, the obligation of the owner is unaffected by the fact that the negligence of the officers contributed to the unseaworthiness. The majority felt that this
doctrine was an application of the non-maritime rule that the employer's duty to furnish a safe place to work and safe appliances was non-delegable, and not qualified by
the fellow servant rule. It seemed to the majority that it would be an anomaly if
the fellow servant rule, which was discredited by the Jones Act as a defense in a
suit for negligence, were to be resuscitated and applied in suits founded on the warranty of unseaworthiness. Why should the Court lower the standard of the owner's
duty to furnish safe appliances below that of the land employer? The rope in the
instant case was defective and hence the staging was unseaworthy. This violated the
employer's duty, regardless of the act of the first officer in negligently choosing the
rope. The fact that good rope was available does not excuse owner's failure to provide
a safe rigging.
This is an unusual statement for the Supreme Court to make. In effect it is
saying that since the statute" is more liberal than the general maritime law, the doc-
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trine of the statute will be applied to a suit under the general maritime law, even
though suit under the Jones Act could not be brought within the statutory time.
Here, the Statute of Limitations in the Jones Act had expired. This argument violates
all canons of statutory interpretation.
The statement taken from The Pinar del Rio that-"The record does not support
the suggestion that the Pinar del Rio was unseaworthy. The mate selected bad rope
when good ones were available"-was relied on by the lower court§. But the Supreme
Court argued that the statement could support the lower courts' decision only on
the assumption either that the presence of sound rope ... afforded an excuse for the
failure to provide a safe staging, or that antecedent negligence of the mate in directing the use of the defective rope relieved the owner from liability for furnishing
the appliance thereby rendered unseaworthy." The Court thought that neither assumption is tenable by reason of the decisions before and since The Pinardel Rio. This
statement is not wholly accurate. While it may be true that nothing will excuse the
owner from the performance of his duty to provide safe appliances, nevertheless it
seems that where there is a negligent act of a fellow seaman which causes an injury,
the owner would not be held liable under the general maritime law. Indeed it was
to alleviate this unfortunate omission that Congress passed the Jones Act. But the
vice of the Mahnich case is that, finding that the ameliorating Jones Act could not
be applied, becabse of the Statute of Limitations, the Court proceeds to bypass The
Pinar del Rio which denied a recovery in similar circumstances and to extend
the maritime law as to seaworthiness so as to include acts of a fellow servant causing
an injury to the seaman. Assuming the Jones Act does not apply, the following
astounding situation follows the Mahnich case: If the negligent act of the fellow servant is directed against the person of the seaman, then the owner will not be liable,
for under the general maritime law a seaman could not recover for the negligence of
a fellow seaman. Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S.130, 49 Sup. Ct. 75 (1928).
If the negligent act of the fellow servant involves an appliance which the seaman
uses, then the owner is liable. This anomaly is due to the enlargement of the concept of unseaworthiness in order to save the day.
In a sharply worded dissent, Mr. Justice Roberts condemned the failure of the
majority to follow the decision in The Pinardel Rio. He emphasized the close parallel
between The Pinar del Rio and the principal case. In The
A
Osceola, 189 U. S. 158, 23 Sup. Ct. 483 (1903), the Court
Strong
held that a shipowner was liable for injuries received by
Dissent
seamen in consequence of unseaworthiness of the ship because of defective appliances. Mr. Justice Roberts observed that the unseaworthiness
must be the cause of the injuries. The mere existence of unseaworthiness is not sufficient to cause liability.
The dissent,, in which Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred, lamented the effect of
changing settled doctrines merely to achieve a desirable end in any particular case.
The effect will be a tendency to weaken the foundation of law; it then becomes a
game of chance. See supra pp. 2-5.
To recover damages for injuries under the general maritime law it was necessary
to show that the vessel was unseaworthy. Chelentis v. Luckenback S. S. Co., 247 U.
S.372, 38 Sup. Ct. 501 (1918); Pacific S. S. Co. v. Peterson, 278 U. S.130, 49 Sup.
Ct. 75 (1928). The vessel must be equipped with safe and proper appliances. Failure to supply the ship with adequate appliances makes the vessel unseaworthy, and
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where injury results, the owner is liable. Cartes v. Baltimore Insular Line, 287
U. S. 367, 53 Sup. Ct. 173 (1932). But where the seaman knows an appliance is
unsafe, he assumes the risk. The Calvert, 51 F. (2d) 494 (C. C. A. 4th, 1931).
To alleviate the rigors of the maritime law in respect to damages for injuries
Congress enacted the Jones Act of 1920. By its provisions those who are seamen
within the meaning of the Act are accorded the benefits of
The
the Federal Employers' Liability Act. Thus seamen on
Jones
American vessels who sign the ship's articles are within the
Act
statute. They may bring an action in personam against the
owners (or their representatives may, where death results) for damages by reason of
the injuries or death caused by the negligence of the officers, agents or employees
of the ship owner. Panama R. R. Co. v. Vasquez, 271 U. S. 557, 46 Sup. Ct. 627
(1926). However, where a seaman uses an appliance which is known to be unsafe,
the doctrine of assumption of risk is not a defense to the action. His contributory
negligence merely diminishes the damages. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305
U. S. 424, 59 Sup. Ct. 262 (1939). Further Section 5 of the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 35 STAT. 45 U. S. C. A. § 55 (1906) prohibits any contract for exemption
from its provisions.
When the Jones Act was enacted in 1920, the Federal Employers' Liability Act
provided that all actions under it must be brought within two years. The Jones Act
consists of qne section of the United States Code adopting in
A
respect to seamen all the provisions of the Liability Act
Nice
in respect to railroad employees. In 1939 Congress extended
Question
the Statute of Limitations of the Federal Employers' Liability Act to three years. No mention was made of the Jones Act. Mr. Justice Roberts
refers to the Statute of Limitations under the Jones Act as being three years, but
cites no precedent. When the point is'properly presented, a nice question will arise
for the determination of the Supreme Court.
The pendulum has swung back again. In former years the seaman had much more
protection than his brothers on the land. With the development of the Workmen's
Compensation Acts the maritime law lagged behind in the amount of protection it
afforded. Then Congress passed the Jones Act to extend liberal provisions to the
seamen. Now the Supreme Court has felt obliged to keep step with Congress. Seamen have become the wards of the Legislature as well as of the Admiralty Court.
EDWIN J. FITZGERADf
INCOME TAX TROUBLES
The Spring rental season for vacant stores and loft buildings has been materially
enhanced by the arrival of a horde of income tax "experts," renting the empty
This
spaces and hanging out neon-lighted signs inviting in the
This
mentally distressed taxpayer for surcease and relief in the
Way
preparation of the confusing and complex tax forms issued
by the Government. The mushroom growth of these establishments is certain to raise some interesting and pertinent questions of law. Not
the least of which is the question: Does the advice and the preparation of income
tax forms constitute the practice of law? Certain it is that this promiscuous peddling
t Former Editor in Chief, FoRmaA
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of street corner advice on the intricate and involved processes of preparing income
tax returns may well call for judicial or legislative action. Already a Brooklyn Congressman has asked for a legislative investigation and charged that the unregulated
establishment of such tax-emporiums threatens to do harm to the persons who approach and rely on the overnight accountants who grind out for a price ($2.50 for
Federal returns; $1.50 for State returns) any and all tax problems submitted to them.
Recently the question of whether the giving out of tax advice and the making of
income tax returns constituted the practice of law was presented in Lowell Bar Association v. Loeb, - Mass. -, 52 N. E. (2d) 27 (1943).
Practice
Herein the stated Bar Association brought a petition in
of
equity to restrain the respondents, who were not members
Law?
of the bar, from giving legal advice regarding liability to
pay income taxes and from the execution of income tax returns.
The offending organization was an unincorporated body having multiple branch
offices in many cities throughout Massachusetts and employing one hundred employees
npne of whom was a member of the bar and only one an accountant. The unincorporated association advertised heavily with "little modesty and restraint" but limited its clientele to working people and the making out of "simple returns." A reassuring line in their advertising was: "We stay with your taxes"--a do-or-die pronouncement to reassure the taxpayer that his tax advisors would provide the client
with the necessary legal advice in the event of any impending difficulties with the
tax department of the state or nation.
Two points in the opinion deserve special mention: The court said: "Confining our
decision to the case at hand, we find the respondent engaged in the business of making
out income tax returns of the least difficult kind." Then folEasy
lows the court's reassuring line: "The blank forms are made
Does
simple . . . and can be readily filled out by any intelligent
taxpayer whose income is derived wholly or almost wholly
from salary or wages who has the patience to study the instructions." (Italics added).
One may well pause before continuing to the next point and ask: Was the Massachusetts Supreme Court by any chance including in the foregoing remarks the current federal income tax return which are now mystifying, befogging, befuddling and confusing
taxpayer, certified public accountant, tax lawyer and even the Federal Bureau of Internal Revenue? The difficulty, if not impossibility, of deciding where documentary simplicity ends and instrumental complexity begins has been neatly phrased by Judge
Pound in People v. Title Guaranty and Trust Company, 227 N. Y. 366, 379, 125
N. E. 666, 670 (1919): "I am unable to rest any satisfactory, test on the distinction
between simple and complex instruments. The most complex are simple to the skilled
and the simplest often trouble the inexperienced."
How true! How true! in relation to current Form 1040 (1944 edition).
The Massachusetts court was able to bring'its sfupport considerable authority to
the effect that the courts have distinguished between simple and complex legal instruments; especially so when these instruments were in the
Simple
form of legal blanks to be filled out after purchase at the
or
corner stationery store.
Complex?
In re Eastern Idaho Loan and Trust Company, 49 Idaho
280, 288 Pac. 157 (1930); Gustapson v. V. C. Taylor and Sons, 138 Ohio St.
392, 35 N. E. (2d) 435 (1941). But a repeated holding out by layman or cor-

